After having been for some while the butt of conservative critics, verse transpositions in Propertius have, mainly thanks to the work of G. P. Goold, again become respectable among scholars. In his edition of Catullus, Tibullus, and Propertius J. J. Scaliger , the great archeget of the method, had subjected the other great elegist of Propertius’ generation to the same treatment,2 and in fact one of Scaliger's transpositions is supported by external evidence: 1.5.71–6 belong after 6.32; this is confirmed by (...) Ovid's imitation in Trist. 2.447ff. Trist. 2. 459–60 echo Tib. 1.6.31f. and 5.73 . That Ovid should have brought together in one distich verses from two different Tibullian poems may not seem wholly impossible, but much less likely than that the lines in Tibullus were also consecutive, in particular because the distich immediately preceding 459f. clearly refers to the situation of Tib. 1.6. (shrink)

Recent work by philosophers of mind and psychology on nonconceptual content.

Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the James-Lange model had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional (see Lange 1885 and James 1890). The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists (including identity theorists) like Robert Solomon and Joel Marks (...) recognize that emotions are intentional but, by reducing them to judgments, beliefs, desires, etc., fail to capture their distinctiveness as mental causes (see Solomon 1976 and Marks 1982). In other words, their place within intentional psychology is acknowledged at the price of denying them their uniqueness. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of (...) the world for a subject. It may be tempting to think of qualitative states as having nonconceptual content since they can be experienced by indi- viduals independently of their possession of the requisite concepts, e.g. someone could experience pains, itches or tingles without possessing the concept pain, itch or tingle. But on such a view, one would have to assume that qualitative states are representational since mental states cannot be candidates for nonconceptuality unless they have intentional properties.2. (shrink)

The revived interest in the emotions has generated much discussion of late. Analyses typically begin by considering the various features that are involved in emotional experience generally, e.g., feeling, physiology, cognition, and behavior. This is often followed by explanations about the role of emotions in rationality, moral psychology, ethics, and/or society, as well as examinations of specific emotions like pride, jealousy, love, or guilt. Overall, the topic has been approached from a diversity of perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, and (...) anthropology. In fact, it’s not uncommon for a single author to assume more than one disciplinary perspective on the features and roles of emotion. (shrink)

I present an argument for the existence of nonconceptual states. A nonconceptual state is an intentional state which does not require the bearer to possess all requisite concepts in order to represent the state. I frame the debate by outlining two constraints that an argument for nonconceptuality should meet. First, successful argument must present a platitude of concepts and illustrate that there are intentional states which both actually violate this platitude and explain behavior independently of conceptual states. This ensures that (...) the notion of nonconceptuality established by the argument will have a significant part in the explanatory arsenal of the intentional psychologist. Secondly, I formulate a platitude of concepts based on the intuition that an individual can only legitimately be held responsible for behavior caused by conceptual states. After qualifying the platitude, I argue that emotional states actually violate the platitude and meet the necessary constraints. Finally, I defend my argument against two challenges: one which denies that the empirical constraint has been met and the other which denies that the robustness constraint has been met. I conclude my discussion with some general remarks on the nature of nonconceptual representation. (shrink)

In the dissertation I provide a framework for assessing arguments intended to establish nonconceptual thought and for presenting my own case based on the emotions. Drawing on the work of Frege, I motivate three principles for individuating conceptual thought which I derive from his notion of sense. For a thought to be conceptual, I claim, it must be distinct from its force, be individuated by its cognitive significance, and determine its reference or correctness conditions. The nonconceptualist's objective, I contend, is (...) to cite a thought which violates at least one of these principles and which plays an unquestionable role in explaining the actions of mature human beings. ;With the framework in place, I turn to recent arguments for nonconceptual thought presented by Peacocke, Evans, Stalnaker, Dretske and others. The point of the review is not only to map the positions of this uncharted debate but to expose contentious assumptions. For example, there is a tendency among theorists to regard nonconceptual thought as more primitive than conceptual thought, as thought through which concepts should be grounded or to which they should be reduced. However, it is apparent that such uses of 'nonconceptuality' often presuppose controversial views about the epistemology of perception and the ontology of concepts. To steer clear of these contentious assumptions, I turn to the emotions, developing a case for nonconceptual thought which does not presuppose that its explanatory value depends on controversial ontological or epistemological agendas. ;The argument I present centers on the content/force distinction. Drawing on speech act theory, I claim that emotions conflate content and force which is most clearly illustrated by the resistance of emotional contents to inferential structure and their logical basicness. The conflation not only helps to explain the arational and ineffable character of nonconceptual thought but also suggests its dependence on conceptual thought, illustrated by the way emotional experiences generally presuppose higher cognitive states like beliefs or judgements. While this reversal of dependency may seem counterintuitive to those who cling to certain epistemological and ontological assumptions, the model has far-reaching implications for theories of content and computation. (shrink)

Book Information On the Emotions. By R. Wollheim. Yale University Press. New Haven/London. 1999. Pp. xiii + 269. Hardback, US$25.00.

Ensemble musicians play in synchrony despite expressively motivated irregularities in timing. We hypothesized that synchrony is achieved by each performer internally simulating the concurrent actions of other ensemble members, relying initially on how they would perform in their stead. Hence, musicians should be better at synchronizing with recordings of their own earlier performances than with others’ recordings. We required pianists to record one part from each of several piano duets, and later to play the complementary part in synchrony with their (...) own or others’ recordings. The pianists were also asked to identify their own recordings. The pianists were better at synchronizing with their own than with others’ performances, and they were able to recognize their own recordings. Furthermore, synchronization accuracy and recognition were correlated: Pianists who were relatively accurate at synchronizing with their own performances were also good at recognizing them. Thus, action simulation may underlie both synchronization and self-recognition. (shrink)

E n est e a r tícul o e l auto r s e pr e gunt a s i l a teorí a socia l de l derech o pued e apo r tar un a contribució n especí f ic a a u n concept o d e justici a via b l e h o y e n día , frent e a l o que sobr e ell a pued e deci r l a f ilosofí (...) a moral , polític a y jurídica . E n s u opinión , lo s conceptos d e autopoiesi s y deconst r ucció n (Luhman n y De r rida ) tiene n e l potencia l su f icient e para act iv a r ta l contribució n e n do s direccione s diferentes : reconst r ucció n d e un a geneal o gía d e l a justici a y obse r v ació n d e la s paradoja s decisionale s de l derech o mode r no . E l planteamient o genealógic o intent a descubri r la s con e xione s oculta s entr e l a semántic a d e la justici a y l a est r uctur a socia l (l o cual , po r otr o lado , pued e desemboca r e n l a refo r mulació n d e u n concept o plausi b l e d e justici a e n la s condicione s actuales) . U n procedimiento deconst r uct ivo pe r mite , a s u v ez , obse r v a r e l hiat o e xistent e entr e la s est r uctura s jurídicas y la s decisiones , u n hiat o qu e pr o v oc a impo r tante s paradoja s e n lo s proceso s d e tom a de decisione s jurídicas . Mediant e ta l obse r v ació n e s posi b l e alcanza r un a comprensió n más profund a d e l a justicia , qu e e l auto r inte r preta , e n últim a instancia , com o u n proces o de autodescripció n de l derech o qu e soc a va e l carácte r recurs ivo d e la s operacione s jurídicas y qu e fuerz a a l derech o a s u autotrascendencia , per o qu e s e sabote a a s í mism o po r qu e en s u realizació n cre a siempr e un a nu eva injusticia : un a e xperienci a cuy a elaboració n literaria anticip ó Heinric h v o n Kleis t e n s u n o v el a Mi c hae l K ohlhaas. (shrink)

Manfred Eigen employs the terms language and communication to explain key recombination processes of DNA as well as to explain the self-organization of human language and communication: Life processes as well as language and communication processes are governed by the logic of a molecular syntax, which is the exact depiction of a principally formalizable reality.

Der Begriff der axiomatischen Basis einer physikalischen Theorie wurde in [1] eingeführt. Die dort gegebene Definition ist zu eng verglichen mit dem, was in der theoretischen Physik angestrebt wird und z. B. für die Quantenmechanik in [2] und [3] durchgeführt ist. Die in dieser Arbeit angegebene, neue Definition einer axiomatischen Basis beschreibt das tatsächliche Vorgehen der theoretischen Physik methodisch besser. Die neue Definition erlaubt es auch, die Untersuchungen über physikalische Begriffe insofern gegenüber [1] zu verbessern, als es möglich ist, sauber (...) zwischen "theoretischen Hilfsbegriffen" und "theoretischen Begriffen" zu unterscheiden. Es läßt sich genauer definieren, was man unter "physikalisch interpretierbaren" Gesetzen verstehen will. Entgegen mancher Meinung wird die Vermutung aufgestellt, daß man jede physikalische Theorie mit "physikalisch interpretierbaren" Gesetzen, d. h. ohne theoretische Hilfsbegriffe formulieren kann. (shrink)

Jahrhunderts. Der Sammelband bietet ausgewählte Beispiele ihrer Rezeption. Näher in Betracht kommen F.H. Jacobi, C. Daub, A. Schopenhauer, J. Müller, S. Kierkegaard, P. Tillich und M. Heidegger."--Publisher's website.

Al-Jāḥiẓ: In Praise of Books. By James E. Montgomery. Edinburgh Studies in Classical Arabic Literature, vol. 2. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013. Pp. vi + 586. $160, £95.

The Utrecht professor of physics Gerrit Moll , well-known for his defence of British science against Charles Babbage's Reflections on the Decline of Science in England , did—in co-operation with members of the Natuurkundig Gezelschap at Utrecht—important work on the reception in The Netherlands of the new electromagnetic and electrodynamic discoveries . He also carried out fundamental research into the lifting power of electromagnets, which he had seen during his visit to London in 1828. In 1830, Moll published (...) his experiments with strong electromagnets having maximum lifting powers of 38 kilograms. With the results of similar experiments performed in the United States by Joseph Henry and Philip ten Eyck in mind, Moll continued his experiments with stronger electromagnets . Furthermore; he investigated the ability of very small galvanic batteries to develop a perceptible magnetism in a great horseshoe . A practical physicist, Moll was hardly interested in theoretical explanations. In The Netherlands his experiments aroused interest in the practical applications of electro- magnetic force. In the present paper, Moll's contributions to the science of electromagnetism and electrodynamics are discussed. (shrink)

The first large discoveries of Menander seem to have given courage to a school of critics who thought Terence a crude and bungling adapter; their attitude is typified by the learned article about him written for Pauly-Wissowaby Günther Jachmann. This exaggeration provoked a counter-exaggeration; a school arose which thought Terence a great original poet, treating his originals as Shakespeare did Plutarch; this was the view of Norwood in England, Croce and various followers in Italy, Erich Reitzenstein in Germany. Then truth (...) began to emerge between the extremes, notably in the exact and intelligent study of Terence's individuality which Hans Haffter published in 1953; in 1968 Walter Ludwig modified the picture, claiming somewhat less. (shrink)

The book introduces a conception of discourse ethics, an intersubjectivist version of Kantian ethics. Analyzing contributions from Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, Albrecht Wellmer, Robert Alexy, Klaus Günther, Rainer Forst, Marcel Niquet and others, it reconstructs critical discussions on the justification of the principle of morality (part I) and on the various proposals on how to apply it (part II). It defends an alternative model of how discourse ethics can provide guidance under non-ideal circumstances and avoid both arbitrariness and (...) rigorism. (shrink)

Este artículo investiga, en cuanto hilo conductor, las transformaciones de la noción de éschaton en la apocalíptica judía y cristiana desde el punto de la vista de la teología de la técnica, además de su tránsito a la filosofía de la tecnología de Günther Anders. El propósito de ello es mostrar cómo, con excepciones y variaciones, la relación entre escatología y apocalipsis se desactiva doblemente, tanto en el cristianismo como en la modernidad tecnológica, para continuar como un hiato que hereda (...) de manera compleja y utópica, y ya por completo secularizado, el programa transhumanista del mejoramiento tecnológico de la biología humana. (shrink)

In the first part of his magnum opus Hans Urs von Balthasarpresents his project of theological aesthetics where the experience of art becomes an entrance to a religious act and an ennobling way leading to the contemplation of God. Defining the essence of being human as a spiritual being directed towards God bears a deep ethical meaning in this consideration. H.U. von Balthasar’s reflection over the religious dimension of the essence of art is shaped within theology but at the same (...) time in the opposition to aesthetic theology which is de-scribed as ‘aesthetisation’ of the Mystery of Revelation. The art of music occupies a particular place in this reflection. For this reason Mass in B Minor BWV 232 by Johann Sebastian Bach, which is an emblematic example of the revelation of the glory of the Lord (Herrlichkeit), will be analysed not only from the perspective of philosophical or musicological aesthetics, but also theological aesthetics. This article outlines characteristic features of theological aesthetics specifically developed from traditional philosophical aesthetics whose range was extended by the human being’s relation to God. (shrink)